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1. Introduction 
There are many similarities between the provision of artificial hydration and 
nutrition ("AHN") and the provision of artificial respiration ("AR"). Many 
ethicists cite these similarities in support of the conclusion that the provision of 
AHN for a patient diagnosed as permanently unconscious ("DPU patient")! is 
always morally optional. 
Such conclusion regarding AHN is not persuasive to the extent it relies on the 
analogy to AR. Even if an individual's moral obligation to use food and water is 
evaluated in terms of the same principles applicable to the use of other medical 
treatments, such principles do not establish that the use of AR for nondying 
DPU patients is always morally optional and, therefore, they do not establish 
that the provision of AHN to nondying DPU patients is always morally 
optional. . 
In this paper I first review some of the literature wherein authors expressly 
compare AHN and AR. The views of those who consider AHN and AR morally 
and medically indistinguishable and those who consider AHN and AR 
fundamentally different are discussed. 
Next, the validity ofthese two views is tested by a case involving each type of 
treatment.2 The Karen Quinlan case is revisited as a vehicle for refining the 
ethical analysis of AR. The Nancy Cruzan case is used as a tool for studying the 
principles involving AHN. The study of these two cases enables us to draw 
certain conclusions regarding the principles governing the prolongation oflife as 
they apply to DPU patients and the particular procedures of AR and AHN. 
2. Literature on AHN and AR: Similarities and Differences 
Cases over the last decade or so involving the withdrawal of AHN from DPU 
patients have forced ethicists to analyze the traditional principles regarding the 
prolongation of life in light of new circumstances. The development 
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of artificial methods of respiration necessitated a reassessment of the ethical 
obligations of individuals in the face of such new technology. Pope Pius XII's 
1957 Address to Anesthesiologists and the case of Karen Quinlan represent 
landmarks in the formulation and resolution of the moral and legal issues 
involved with AR. For the most part, great uniformity of opinion evolved 
concerning the ethical obligations regarding AR. 
In applying these same principles to cases involving AHN, ethicists have had 
recourse to the development that occurred in the debate over AR. Some 
ethicists have based, in part, their conclusions regarding AHN on their 
evaluation of the degree to which AHN should be treated as similar to or 
different from AR. 
a) Similarities 
Authors who consider AHN and AR morally indistinguishable base their 
conclusion on several factors.3 First, air is as essential to the maintenance of the 
patient receiving AR as food and water are to the patient receiving AHN. 
Although each of these necessities oflife is essential to any person, whether sick 
or not, the individual's moral obligation to avail oneself of such necessities is 
governed by the same principles applicable to the duty to seek medical 
treatment. In this regard, food and water and air are similar to blood, insulin 
and a properly functioning heart. Each of these is necessary for the healthy 
person and for the sick person. One's duty to utilize the mans of obtaining each 
such essential component of a healthy life (i.e., AHN, AR, transfusion, 
injection, transplant, respectively) is evaluated in terms of the usefulness of 
such means and the burdens associated with their use. 
Second, both essentials oflife, food and water and air, are delivered to the 
patient by artificial means made available through developments in medical 
technology. 
Third, in the absence of either AHN or AR, the patient will die in a relatively 
short period of time. When a patient survives after the withdrawal of AR, as 
Karen Quinlan did, such survival is contrary to all reasonable expectations. 
Thus, from an ethical perspective, the death of the patient after the withdrawal 
of AR is to be treated as foreseen with moral certitude. 
Fourth, both AHN and AR are provided to bypass or circumvent a 
condition of the patient which causes or results in the patient's inability to 
chew or swallow, in the one case, or to breathe, in the other case. In cases of 
DPU patients involving AHN, the inability to chew or swallow is caused by an 
injury or defect of the brain which prevents the alimentary system, which is 
otherwise intact and operable, from functioning. In cases of DPU patients 
involving AR, the respiratory system itself is inoperable or insufficiently 
operable to serve its normal respiratory function. 
Fifth, the withdrawal of both AHN and AR can be characterized as allow-
ing the patient to die rather than introducing a new cause of death. In 
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both cases the patient dies from a combination of the withdrawal of AHN or 
AR, as applicable, and the malfunctioning of the alimentary or respiratory, as 
applicable, system. Such malfunctioning is not attributable to any action on the 
part of those who withdraw the life support mechanism, but rather, to the 
pre-existing injury or defect of the patient. 
b) Differences 
Authors who consider AHN and AR fundamentally different base their 
conclusion on several factors.4 First, while AR is clearly medical treatment, 
AHN is a fundamental necessity of life and, as such, is provided as basic 
nursing or human care of the patient. The provision of food and water is 
analogous to other acts of simple compassion and care such as turning the 
patient to prevent bed sores, providing a proper room temperature and 
providing for the basic hygienic needs of the patient. The mechanism for 
delivering AHN, particularly in the case of a gastrostomy tube, is relatively 
simple and does not raise the spectre of excessive medical technology 
associated with the mechanism for delivering AR. 
Second, AR generally constitutes extraordinary means, whereas AHN 
constitutes ordinary means, of sustaining life. Given that AHN is utilized in 
many cases involving patients who are in no sense terminal, AHN is viewed as 
a relatively simple substitute for the ordinary means of sustenance provided by 
food and water. 
Third, the withdrawal of AHN introduces a new cause of death, namely, 
dehydration and malnutrition, whereas the withdrawal of AR allows the 
patient to die from an underlying condition. Questions regarding the 
withdrawal of AHN have arisen most prominently in cases of DPU patients. 
So long as AHN is provided, such patients are not expected to die from any 
underlying illness. AR, however, is associated with cases of patients who have 
incurable and un treatable conditions and who will die from such conditions 
notwithstanding the provision of AR. 
Fourth, AHN is a supplement whereas AR is a subsittute. The alimentary 
system of DPU patients is functional and such system will perform its 
biological role provided that the normal means of delivering food and water 
(i.e. through the mouth) is bypassed. In cases involving the use of AR, the 
patient's respiratory system is completely incapable of functioning. 
Fifth, the withdrawal of AHN can have only one result - the death of the 
patient; the withdrawl of AR can result in the death of the patient, but such 
result is not inevitable and patients (such as Karen Quinlan) can live for years 
without AR. 
Sixth, the provision of food and water to a person in need, whatever the 
mans used, has important symbolic significance. 
Seventh, if the withdrawal of AHN from non-terminal DPU patients is 
accepted, there will be no means of preventing society from accepting active 
euthanasia. 
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c) Comments 
A thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of the proffered distinctions 
and similarities is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the effort here is to 
demonstrate that the argument for treating AHN and AR as indistinguishable 
is not sufficient to support the conclusion that AHN is always morally optional 
for a DPU patient. 
Yet, such argument is made. Some of those who maintain that AHN is 
always morally optional frame the argument as follows: 
The provision of AR for a DPU patient is always morally optional. 
AHN and AR are morally and medically indistinguishable. 
Therefore, the provision of AHN for a DPU patient is always morally optional.5 
The argument contains at least on~ significant flaw. Even if one grants, for 
purpose of the argument, the validity of the minor premise, the validity of the 
major premise is questionable. The "general view" that AR for a DPU patient 
is always morally optional needs to be reassessed because it provides a 
significant foundation for the conclusion regarding AHN. 
To that end, the cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan are reviewed as 
vehicles for the exploration of the ethics of withholding6 AHN and AR from 
DPU patients. 
3. Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan 
a) Quinlan 
On April 15, 1975 Karen Quinlan was involved in an automobile accident 
in which she sustained numerous injuries.7 The length of time she was without 
spontaneous respiration is unknown. Upon arrival at the hospital, medical 
personnel diagnosed her as being in a coma. She remained in this state for a 
period of time, after which time she entered a persistent vegetative state. 
Ms. Quinlan's father sought to be appointed Karen's guardian with legal 
authority to direct the removal of her respirator. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court granted Mr. Quinlan's petition. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court described Ms. Quinlan's condition as 
irreversible and terminal, with death being imminent. The court viewed Karen 
as having no reasonable "possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life."8 
Based on the unanimous view of her physicians, the court stated that Karen 
would die in less than a year even with continued use of the respirator and that 
removal of the respirator would result in her death in a matter of minutes. In 
effect, the court viewed the respirator as prolonging the biological life of 
someone waiting to die.9 
According to the court, the cause of Ms. Quinlan'S terminal condition was 
her inability to breathe without the aid of the respirator. This inability was due 
to a "lesion on the cerebral hemispheres and a lesion in the brain stem." Based 
on this understanding, the court concluded that ccntinued use ofthe respirator 
would constitute extraordinary means in that the treatment was 
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futile. 10 
Bishop Lawrence Casey, the Bishop of Paterson (the diocese in which the 
Quinlans resided), submitted a statement to the court in which he applied 
Church teaching to Ms. Quinlan's case. I I Bishop Casey reviewed the principles 
set forth in Pope Pius XII's address to anesthesiologists concerning the use of 
artificial resperators. In that address, Pope Pius concluded that in the case of a 
person "in a state of deep unconsciousness" where "only automatic artificial 
resperation is keeping [the patient] alive" and where "the soul may already left 
the body", the use of a respirator was morally optional. 12 Bishop Casey 
expressly rejected euthanasia and defined euthanasia to include the causing of 
the death of a patient who is "deemed unable to live a so-called meaningful 
life." 13 
Bishop Casey viewed Miss Quinlan'S condition as hopeless in that she had 
"no reasonable hope of recovery from her comatose state". He concluded that 
in such circumstances continued use of the respirator constituted extraordinary 
means and, therefore, was morally optional. There is no evidence from Bishop 
Casey's statement that he considered use of the respirator unduly burdensome. 
Rather, his conclusion seemed to be based on the judgment that her coma 
constituted a terminal condition and that continued use of the respirator was 
useless in that it was prolonging her dying.14 
Leading theologians shared Bishop Casey's conclusions. Paul Ramsey and 
William May, for example, viewed Karen Quinlan as terminal and the 
continued use of the respirator as useless. They justified its removal on that 
specific ground. 15 
b) Cruzan 
Nancy Cruzan was injured in an automobile accident on January 11, 
1983.16 After her accident, she continued to exhibit brain stem activity and, 
thus, continued to breathe on her own without the aid of a respirator, but 
experienced damage to all other areas of the brain, including those areas which 
control swallowing and chewing. 
At the time of the proceedings, she was unconscious, though no longer in a 
coma, unresponsive to her environment, except for reflexive responses to 
sound and perhaps to painful stimuli, and was a spastic quadraplegic. Her 
blood pressure was normal, her pulse was regular and her respiration was 
spontaneous. She had severe, irreversible upper hemispheric brain damage 
with progressive degeneration of the brain. Her condition was considered 
permanent. She received nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy tube 
which had been surgically implanted. The experts agreed that she had no 
condition which would cause her death and that, if AHN was provided, she 
could continue to live for thirty years. The entire cost of her care was paid for 
by the State of Missouri. 17 
c) Quinlan and Cruzan 
Many similarities exist between the cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy 
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Cruzan. Some of the similarities in the physical condition of both patients have 
led authors to conclude that the cases are indistinguishable morally. Those 
who maintain this view focus on the hopelessness of the conditions. 
Many of those who supported the decisions of the Quinlans and the Cruzans 
to seek withdrawal of life support measures did so on the ground that 
continued use of such measures was futile. In the Quinlan case, the parties 
based their conclusion on a belief that Karen was terminal, whereas in the 
Cruzan case, certain parties viewed Nancy as terminal (or dying) under an 
expanded definition of such term. 
Since the notions ofterminal and futile played such an important role in the 
analysis of the Quinlan and Cruzan cases, a reassessment of these terms is 
warranted. This reassessment begins with an analysis of the meaning of 
terminal in the Quinlan case and the grounds for the conclusion that AR was 
useless in her case. This review is followed by a similar analysis of the Cruzan 
case. Following these analyses, the burdensomeness of AHN and AR will be 
assessed. 
4. Effectiveness: Principles and Application of Principles 
a) Quinlan 
The record in the Quinlan case reflects the confusion evident at the time in 
the understanding of Karen's condition. Initially, Karen's father sought an 
order declaring her brain dead. Both the lower court and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court consistently referred to Karen as being in an irreversible coma, 
notwithstanding that the medical experts, for the most part, described Karen as 
being in a persistent vegetative state. 18 Bishop Casey described Karen as being 
in a coma, as did Prof. Ramsey.19 
This confusion was not surprising; the medical community at the time had 
not agreed upon uniform terminology for describing the various conditions: 
Beginning in the 1970's, however, neurological specialists began using the same term 
to apply to patients in the persistent vegetative state, such as Karen Quinlan. Thus, 
some physicians would use "irreversible coma" to mean brain death while others 
would use it to mean the persistent vegetative state. Even today, physicians use the 
term "irreversible coma" in at least three different ways: whole brain death, persistent 
vegetative state, or as a general term for all types of permanently unconscious 
patients.20 
Based on the testimony of the medical experts, Karen was not, at the time of 
the trial, in a coma, but rather, was in a persistent vegetative state. The 
difference is significant: 
[Coma] [p ]atients ... often have impaired cough, gag, and swallowing reflexes with a 
resultant inability (involuntary) to clear the passages of the throat and lungs. This 
impairment leads to frequent, often fatal, respiratory infections - a common cause of 
death in comatose patients, and one of the major reasons why truly comatose patients 
typically do not experience the long-term survival period associated with the 
vegetative state. Thus, in one sense it is reasonable to describe comatose patients as 
"terminally ill," with death anticipated in six months to a year , unless 
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extremely vigorous therapeutic efforts are made to sustain life.21 
The confusion over an accurate understanding of Karen's condition seems to 
have had a significant influence on the ethical analysis. 
In hindsight, we now know that Ms. Quinlan had no underlying condition 
which would have resulted in her death in a relatively short period of time if 
treatment was provided. Her condition made her susceptible to deadly 
infections and use of the respirator increased her vulnerability. But, such 
conditions, when they arose, could be treated.22 
Karen Quinlan lived for nine years after the respirator was removed.23 
Karen Quinlan, and patients like her, are not terminal or dying, unless such 
terms are used in an unconventional way. A patient in Karen's condition is 
terminal if by terminal one means that there is no hope of recovery from the 
neurological damage sustained.24 Treatment is futile for such patient in that life 
support measures are ineffective in restoring the patient to a certain level of 
cognitive functioning. 
But, the purpose of life-sustaining treatments is to sustain the life of the 
patient, not to reverse neurological damage or restore cognitive functioning. 
As such, the use of life-sustaining treatments, such as AR or AHN, for a 
nondying DPU patient, is generally effective and useful in achieving the 
purpose of such treatments. 
Two additional observations can be made with respect to the Quinlan case. 
First, on the basis of what we know now, continued use of the respirator was 
unnecessary to the maintenance of Karen's life; after the respirator was 
removed, Karen continued to breathe on her own for nine years. Thus, a 
decision to remove the respirator could have been made on the ground of its 
uselessness. The respirator was useless in that it did not contribute to 
maintaining Karen's life, not in that Karen's life was not worth maintaining. 
Second, the basis for such decision is different from the grounds advanced at 
the time to justify removal of the respirator. At the time, those involved 
considered continued use of the respirator useless on two grounds: (1) that 
Karen would have died in a relatively short period of time even ifthe respirator 
were continued and (2) that the respirator could not restore Karen's life to a 
meaningful existence. The first ground turned out to be factually incorrect. The 
second ground is an unacceptable basis for a determination that life sustaining 
treatment is futile in that it requires such treatment to achieve an end which 
such treatment is neither designed nor intended to achieve. 
b) Cruzan 
The conditiori of Nancy Cruzan was such that, with treatment, she could 
have lived for thirty years. She, too, was not terminal or dying, in any 
customary sense of such terms. The provision of AHN to Nancy Cruzan was 
useless only in the sense that AHN would not cure or treat the injury to 
her brain and, therefore, would not improve her level of cognitive 
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functioning. The arguments set forth above against the reasonableness of such 
use of the terms terminal and useful are applicable with equal force to the 
Cruzan case. 
5. Burden 
a) Principles 
The decision to discontinue the respirator in Karen Quinlan's case has also 
been justified on the ground of burden. Continued use of a respirator may be 
morally optional if it is unduly burdensome, whether or not the patient is 
terminal. Fr. lohn Connery, S.l. did not view Karen's condition as terminal. He 
considered the initial use of the respirator in her case to constitute ordinary 
means.25 However, continued use of the respirator over a long period of time 
made it excessively burdensome: 
[Al)though procedures of this kind [giving oxygen, IV feeding, blood transfusions) 
would not be classified as extraordinary on a short term basis, e.g., to pull a patient 
through a crisis, if they had to become a way oflife, even today they would fall into this 
class, e.g., long term or permanent use of an artificial respirator. The burden of such use 
could make them intolerable.26 
The burdensome nature of the treatment places a limit on one's duty to 
preserve life or health. A patient may decide to forego treatment on the basis of 
burden provided that the patient's intention is to avoid or relieve the burden, 
rather than to shorten one's life.27 In order for a decision to reflect a choice to 
remove a burden rather than to shorten one's life, the treatment involved must 
be burdensome. 
A treatment can be burdensome in several ways. A treatment may be 
burdensome to the patient if it is a burden to the patient, to the patient's family or 
to society.28 A treatment may be burdensome if it imposes emotional, financial, 
psychologicai or physiological hardships. The assessment of burden may also 
involve a weighing of the pain or expense of the treatment in relation to the 
prospective benefit which the treatment offers.29 The reasonableness of one's 
judgment regarding burden will depend upon the circumstances of the 
particular case and the type of life support treatment involved. 
In the case of a conscious person, competent or incompetent, long-term use of 
life-sustaining treatments ~y be judged excessively burdensome on several 
grounds: cost of the treatment to the patient or his family, painfulness of the 
treatment to the patient, impairment of activity due to the treatment, 
psychological pain to the patient or his family, disruption to the lives offamily 
members and distraction from attention to other important tasks or 
disproportion between the effort (use ofresources, personnel, cost) involved in 
providing the treatment and the benefits to the patient.30 
The analysis of burden in the case of a DPU patient is further complicated by 
the condition of the patient. When the patient is diagnosed as permanently 
unconscious, caution must be exercised in determining whether the aspects of 
treatment that were burdensome to a conscious patient (competent 
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or incompetent) are also burdensome to an unconscious patient. This caution 
is warranted not because a patient loses rights when he becomes unconscious 
(he doesn't), but rather, because the basis for the conclusion that the treatment 
is burdensome may have been removed when the patient lost consciousness. 
In the case of a OPU patient, it is difficult to argue that the patient 
experiences any burden associated with treatment, other than financial 
hardships in certain cases.31 OPU patients most probably do not experience 
pain or any emotional or intellectual distress. Treatment of OPU patients 
imposes no restrictions on liberty not already present due to the patient's 
condition. While the benefits reasonably to be expected from continued 
treatment are minimal, the burdens, to the patient, associated with such 
treatment may be virtually nonexistent. 
The care of a OPU patient may be burdensome to the patient's family. The 
assessment of burden to the patient's family involves a review of many of the 
same factors which are relevant to the analysis of burden in the case of a 
conscious patient. 
However, many times, burdens experienced by family members relate to the 
condition of the patient rather than the treatment.32 The experience of family 
members seeing a loved one in a state of severe disability is extremely painful. 
But the discontinuation of treatment would not relieve the family's burden. 
That relief would come only with the death of the patient. But to seek the death 
of the patient is to choose death, not to remove the burden of treatment. 
Furthermore, although the burdens associated with the patient's condition 
may be real and quite painful, generally, in the absence of a clear expression of 
the patient's wishes, they are not advanced as the reason for the 
disGontinuation of treatment. More typically, the rationale is to the effect that 
the patient would not want to live under such circumstances. 
b) Application of Principles 
Based on the analysis outlined above we can apply such principles to the 
cases of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan. 
If Karen were conscious, removal of the respirator could have been justified 
on the basis of burden to the patient. The burdensomeness of the treatment 
consisted not only in the use of the respirator, but also the hardships associated 
with intensive care.33 
But Karen Ann Quinlan was unconscious. She did not, to the best of our 
knowledge, experience the hardship associated with the respirator and 
intensive care. What aspects of her treatment were burdensome in her 
condition? 
Germain Grisez identifies two factors that made Karen Quinlan's 
treatment burdensome: the cost of intensive care and the psychological 
burden to her parents who thought that the respirator was painful to Karen.34 
While the cost of ICU and the respirator was expensive and, as such, would 
constitute a financial burden if such costs were born by the 
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patient or the family, Karen's mother testified that the family did not bear such 
COSt. 35 Thus, the ground of expense (to the patient or the family) is not 
sustainable in the Quinlan case. 
The psychological burden to Karen's parents was real, whether or not Karen 
experienced pain, because they thought the respirator troubled her. This 
distress on the part of the family was distinct from and in addition to the pain 
associated with Karen's condition. Thus, it provides a legitimate basis for a 
determination of burden to the family. There is no evidence, however, that 
Karen would have decided to discontinue treatment for this reason or that the 
decision of her parents was actually made on this basis.36 Further, to the extent 
that neurologists convincingly demonstrate that DPU patients do not 
experience any pain, the psychological burden to the family can be mitigated. 
Thus, removal of the respirator could not be justified in the Quinlan case on 
the basis of burden to Karen (without consideration of the effects of the 
treatment on family or society). The treatment was not painful to her, either 
emotionally or physically, it was not financially burdensome and it did not 
restrict her liberty. The treatment was not disproportionate in that even though 
the benefits were minimal, there was no burden to her in continuing the 
treatment. 
Continued use of the respirator could constitute grounds for a determination 
of burden to the family to the extent that the respirator, as opposed to Karen's 
condition of severe disability, caused psychological pain to her family. The 
evidence does not indicate that pain to the family was the basis for the family's 
decision. 
Based upon the above conclusions regarding continued use of the respirator, 
we must next consider AHN. We can explore the question of whether AHN is 
morally optional for a patient in Karen Quinlan's condition by looking at 
Nancy Cruzan's case. Nancy Cruzan, in a sense37, is Karen Quinlan after the 
respirator was removed. 
Removal of AHN from Nancy cannot be justified on the ground of burden 
to Nancy (without consideration of the effects of treatment on the family or 
society). Given Nancy's condition, the provision of AHN was not painful to 
her in any emtional, physical or psychological sense. The treatment was not 
economically burdensome since the cost was paid for entirely by the state. 
Given the absence of any other burdens and the minimal benefit treatment 
provided, the provision of AHN was not disproportionate. 
Nancy's family certainly bore the pain associated with attending to Nancy 
in her state of severe disability. But that pain was caused by Nancy's 
condition. There is no evidence that the treatment itself caused the family 
distress. In fact, in the Missouri lower court proceeding which authorized the 
discontinuation of AHN for Nancy, the doctors recommended that the 
gastrostomy tube be left in place after AHN was discontinued so as to 
facilitate the provision of medications.38 If Nancy were alert, responsive and 
interacting with her family on an intellectual and emotional level, there 
May, 1992 57 
is little doubt that the family would have sought to continue the very same 
treatment they sought to discontinue. Nancy's condition was distressing; but to 
alleviate Nancy's condition by eliminating Nancy is to remove the burden of 
Nancy, not the burden of treatment. 
6. Conclusion 
Recent cases involving DPU patients have forced ethicists to revisit the 
ethics of prolonging life and to analyze more closely the meaning of the terms 
useless and burden. 
In considering the ethical obligations surrounding AHN, many ethicists 
have analyzed the issue by comparing AHN with AR. Such effort has resulted 
in a conclusion by some authors that AHN and AR are essentially the same 
while other authors have come to the opposite conclusion. Ethicists on both 
sides of the issue, however, seem to begin with the premise that AR in such 
circumstances is always morally optional. 
The "general impression" concerning AR developed in great part in 
response to the circumstances surrounding the Karen Quinlan case. 
A review of the Quinlan case, however, shows that it does not support the 
proposition that AR is always morally optional for a nondying DPU patient. 
The conclusion reached by many at the time, that AR was morally optional on 
the ground of futility, was based on a combination of an incorrect 
understanding of Ms. Quinlan's medical condition and an unacceptable 
understanding of the meaning of usefulness. The record in the case shows that 
Karen was not a coma patient in imminent danger of death, but rather, was a 
nondying DPU patient who, like other nondying DPU patients, had no 
reasonable prospect of regaining cognitive functioning. 
Thus, the use oflife-sustaining treatments for such nondying DPU patients is 
generally effective and useful in achieving the purpose of such treatment. 
However, the provision of AR for Karen was useless in the sense that it was 
unnecessary for the conservation of Karen's life. 
Moreover, the Quinlan case does not support the conclusion that AR is 
always morally optional on the basis of burden. While burden can be 
established in the Quinlan case, it rests on the particular circumstances of that 
case (e.g., emotional pain to the patient's family who thought the respirator 
was painful to Karen). The more common ground for demonstrating the 
burden of treatment, that is, burden to the patient, is not established by the 
Quinlan case. 
The analysis of the effectiveness and burdensome ness of life sustaining 
treatment in the Quinlan case applies to the Cruzan case. Nancy Cruzan had no 
underlying condition which, if treated, would have resulted in her death. She 
was not terminal and the provision of AHN was effective in conserving her life. 
The provision of AHN to Nancy did not constitute a burden to her or her 
family. 
Thus, even if it can be convincingly demonstrated that AHN and AR are 
morally and medically indistinguishable in cases of nondying DPU 
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patients, it does not follow that AHN is always morally optional in such cases 
because it has not been demonstrated that AR is always morally optional in 
such cases. 
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